On Moral Judgements - Objectivism Versus Subjectivism

By: Brad Camroux

Ethics can be defined as the "science" of morals in human conduct. Thus moral judgements, whether something is good or bad in its own right, are contained wholly in the field of ethics. Indeed, it is the job of ethics to decide whether or not such judgements are objective or subjective in nature. By definition, an "objectivist" holds the belief that moral truths exist apart from human knowledge or perception of them. That is, something may be inherently good or bad, whether or not we see or acknowledge it. Conversely, the "subjectivist" maintains that knowledge is merely subjective and there exists no external or objective truth. Unfortunately, many people develop differing opinions on the matter, making it very difficult to come to a consensus on the matter. Here, I will look at the two opposing views of Bertrand Russell, the subjectivist, and Brand Blanshard, the objectivist.

Moral judgements are used to assign values to certain issues with which we are concerned as humans. Mr. Russell claims that "Questions as to "values". . . lie outside the domain of science. . . ." (Russell 306). He goes further to say that they actually lie completely outside the domain of knowledge. These statements make sense in that it is not possible, for example, for anybody to scientifically determine whether or not it is bad to kill a person. All that we are allowed to do is make a statement as to our personal feelings on the issue. This carries into the second statement, where it is not possible for us as humans to know if murder itself carries any inherent goodness or badness. Thus a subjectivist would simply say that we do not know whether something is good or bad until we stumble upon it. At that point we must make a decision based entirely on our feelings at that moment in time. This, however, is not the only option. An objectivist, when faced with the statement pertaining to knowledge, would say that it is nonsense. Such a person would say that everything has its own inherent value - it's own goodness or badness. This is a fact which remains whether or not our personal feelings change (Russell 306). If such were true, however, then we must be able to find such facts using science - an objective methodology in which the repeatability of an experiment is key. If only one person can do the experiment, then it is worthless. Subsequently it is true that the results of a scientific experiment are open to interpretation. This is the only way in which science can be thought of as subjective. Science, however, has yet to come up with a method for determining the goodness or badness of an issue. It is concerned only with what is true or false.

Brand Blanshard, on the other hand, has found several problems with subjectivism in ethical judgements. One such argument uses the example of a rabbit which got caught in a trap and died. When we stumble upon the trap and find that in trying to escape the rabbit has all but chewed its leg off, we would likely make the statement "It was a bad thing that the little animal should suffer so" (Blanshard 339). The subjectivist account would be that nothing bad happened to the rabbit until we came along and discovered it (Blanshard 339). In other words, it wasn't bad until we decided that it was. The objectivist here says that there was indeed some inherent badness to the situation. The fact that the poor rabbit suffered so much was bad, regardless of our feelings on the matter. This can be discovered by reflecting on the incident several days later, when our initial feeling is (near) gone. Can we really say that it now was not a bad thing that the rabbit suffered? We may not feel it quite as strongly, but it was still bad. We clearly mean the same thing a week later in saying "it was a bad thing for the rabbit to suffer" as we did when we stumbled upon it. Hence, because we said the same thing in spite of our feelings, it cannot be our feelings which we are expressing (Blanshard 341).

Bertrand Russell adopts the theory which supports the subjectivity of judgements because of "the complete impossibility of finding any arguments to prove that this or that has intrinsic value" (Russell 308). This view is based on the premise that science is only interested in what is true or false. Science cannot lay value judgements on anything. However, just because science cannot find such answers, does not necessarily mean they do not exist.

The notion of duty relies completely on the existence of objective truths. We see it as our duty to do that which is "right" or "good." This obviously requires that such acts of duty have some natural ethical value. Subjectivists would deny this necessity, stating that you do what is right in your mind (Blanshard 344). It is in our interest to try to discover the act - that which is required of us by duty. If the subjectivists are correct, then there is no hope of finding such an act, because only our feelings at the time are important. This is very difficult for me to accept. It would mean that self-improvement is not necessary. As long as you are doing what you feel is right at the time, then you are in the right. Discovery of the objective good requires much more than feeling. Once such a discovery is made, however, our feelings come into play. Thus Bertrand Russell says that ". . . Every attempt to persuade people that something is good (or bad) in itself, and not merely in its effects, depends on the art of rousing feelings, not upon an appeal to evidence" (Russell 307). It is extremely difficult to prove that your feelings on a specific matter are relevant. You must do your best to convince the other party that this is the case. This is all that can be done.

So it doesn't really seem to make much sense to talk about the "objectivity" or "subjectivity" of moral judgements. It is very well possible that they are both. That is, a judgement of something as "good" could be expressing both the intricate nature of the object or action, as well as your feelings about it. Then again, it is also possible that moral judgements are neither objective nor subjective. No amount of introspection and reflection will bring you to the desired objective truth . Similarly, no amount of experimentation will prove that your feelings are the correct ones. This argument seems to make the most sense to me, although the former could very well be correct.

Hence it seems the debate between objectivity and subjectivity is at a stand-still. Without the ability to apply science to questions of moral judgements, it is very difficult to assign objective values (good or bad) to such judgements. Yet at the same time, subjectivism is just not sufficient. It is not quite acceptable to say that upon making such an ethical judgement, you are stating nothing more than your feelings on the subject. We need more to work on - subjectivity denies us the notion of duty, and that is what we base our lives on.

Works Cited

Blanshard, Brand. "The New Subjectivism in Ethics." A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, Third Edition. Ed. Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1973. 338-345.

Russell, Bertrand. "Science And Ethics." A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, Third Edition. Ed. Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1973. 305-310.